Loss Statistics

from .. to
history
2024 is key: the economics
Big Ticket Items
Refineries & Disruptions
Boycott
New Artillery: September 24
Forecast And Scenarios: artillery
Forecast And Scenarios: tanks
Send your feedback & thoughts

Forecast And Scenarios: Artillery

Multiple sources of information make it hard to get a clearer picture. But there are valid open-source actors who provide reliable confirmations and estimates based on imagery.
Using data, numeric, elements of visual proof, one can then work with assumptions with varying degrees of confidence.
This can then be integrated into an algorithm to evaluate the incidence of scenarios on equipment losses, in this case artillery.
Data points
How much artillery is available? One conservative set of estimates, puts 2,963 SP and 6,485 towed units available to the RU army, or a total of 9,448 systems. Pre-war, this was 23,580 systems.
A less conservative estimate from RUSI has 956 SP, 3824 towed in the theater of operations. 2000 would be in storage. 6 800 total
Zodiac41 provides interesting analysis of artillery in the field by counting the units of artillery assigned to military units, combining with the logistical impact and ru's information on tonnage shipped.
TL;DR self-propelled: max 2000 in field, 1333 not supportable by logistics. towed: max 2128 in field, 1418 unsupportable.
2751 unsupported units could be in storage; double counting is possible. Still Zodiac41's count totals 6878.
Thus, the highest figure would be 6878 + 4656 (storage items, excluding D-30 and M-30) or about 11500. Confidence factor: Very High within the interval, which is still large (3700 pieces)

Self-attrition Derived from images, cases of bad ammunition and normal barrel wear, Lost per month to wear/cannibalization has been estimated at around 307 units per ... month!
Confidence factor: Average to high. Rascia uses a lot of ammo; nothing shows a slowdown at present. With less available storage items, odds of problematic items (seen withdrawn unevenly from storage areas), this figure is probably a high water mark. Less cannibalisation, but also less useful units.

New production Estimated at below 100 units/year
Confidence factor: Average to high... until there is news of massive shipments from North Korea, Iran or China.
Sample visual support ( kudos to @hizzo_jay )
there's a lot more in those sources
Omsk Storage Base for SPGs Towed 4th area
May 2021

May 2023


Omsk Storage for Hyacinth and Tulip Initially full
May 2023: Hyacinth barely touched, Tulip very depleted


Omsk Storage for Hyacinth Initially full
May 2023: less than 1/2 of pre-war Hyacinth WITH barrels remain


Omsk Second Storage for Hyacinth pre-war

May 2023: less than 1/3 WITH barrels remain


Omsk Third Storage for Hyacinth pre-war

May 2023: less than 1/3 WITH barrels remain


Omsk Peonia Storage June 2023: very few remain WITH barrels
2S7



Omsk : more before/after images as of 2024.01.10 Courtesy of @HighMarsed
2S3, 2S4, 2S5
2S1, 2S4
2S3, 2S5
2S7
2S19


Bryansk SPG Storage pre-war

May 2023: Msta removed or cannibalised


Cannibalisation May 2023: In red frame, unit without barrels


111th Arsenal in Khal´gaso (50.696247, 136.865305), Chabarowsk Krai (for BMP) 2022 (no further comment)



Working assumptions on losses
Artillery losses are hard to confirm They are behind enemy lines, under communications embargo by the enemy. Thus the confirmed / full_loss ratio is probably lower.
On the other hand, Ukraine has a lot of observation drones. The question becomes how much does UA MoD want to show.
Keep in mind two issues. Ukraine probably has access to imagery that allow for better accounting of items and distance from the front.
Also this news item where additional time off is promised in return for confirmation destructions, is symptomatic of field reports being bloated.

Confidence factor: medium to high

Constant rate of loss equivalent to that post-April 2023? This assumption is the 'safe' assumption.
However, 30-day µ of losses in february-march 2023 communicated was 20.
19 by september, 17 in december.
On March 7, 2024, the 30-day µ is 33. 50 to 60% greater.
Confidence factor: medium. The preference is to rely on a proportion of what UA MoD communicates.
This reference who works with the Covert Cabal data set states: "Since May 2023, UA MoD have been reporting 700 hits on RU arty on average. This is 32% above our estimate."
That is a solid data point to start to use against the 30-day µ reported by UA MoD.

Consideration of D-1 & M-30 field artillery There are few confirmed loses or sightings on the assumption of a depletion of relevant ammunition.
WWII-era items. Firing range max: 12.4 km
Confidence factor: medium to nil. One has to assume a binary situation: ammo available or not. So it is all in or all out.
This is not insignificant as they represent 44% of the remaining stock of towed artillery.

Consideration of self-propelled 2S1 2S1 makes up 49% of the remaining stock where their removal rate is substantially lower than that for other SPs which also leads to shortage of 122mm assumptions.
Firing range: 15 km (22 km extended).
Confidence factor: medium to nil. The same assumption as for field artillery can be made: all-in or all out.
This adds to the key success factor of drones up to 15 kms behind the lines.


Updated data on stored items CovertCabal & HighMarsed in particular have done recounts over June and July 2024.
mid-2023 figures, where available are also represented to give an idea of rate of withdrawl (there are inconsistencies due to recognition from image quality)
Following are comparison figures pre-war to recent with year of entry in service and firing ranges.
One variable that must be considered is UAV/FPV and their ranges. Without repeaters, their range is generally given at 20 kms.
Combine that 'exposure factor' with the age/range of item and the fact that what was easily brought out of storage to deliver to the front was certainly a priority.
This leaving harder to restore, junk items behind, which is also confirmed by the rate of withdrawl.
Self-propelled
model 2S1 2S3 2S4 2S5 2S7 2S9 2S19 sum
entry year 1972 1971 1972 1978 1976 1989 2014
firing range kms 15.3
21.9
18.5
24
10
20
28.4
37
37
47
9
13
24.7
36
# early 2022 1581 860 397 626 218 466 117 4273
# mid 2023 1377 545 202 341 104 294 130 2993
# mid 2024 1141 545 202 341 72 193 71 2565

Run Your Forecast (please read above)

Available units on Feb 19, 2024 (6800-10500)
Declared destroyed by UA Mod since 19-02-24 10394.0
Monthly rate of self-attrition (10-300)
include field artillery D-1 & M-30
include self-propelled 2S1
Average daily rate of losses (today's 30-day µ shown) 33.8
Discount % of UA MoD declarations (20 to 40%)
   Help Ukraine keep innovating Support small enterprises build drones, FPV or otherwise:   
wild hornets    toro ua    night butterfly on X   Veterans Ukraine   Avdiivka volunteer on X
Shadow subdivision their channel

fund an fpv 5375 4112 1065 5986 PayPal pigeonforge2020@gmail.com (for Shadow)

fund a Mavic 5375 4112 1092 7062 PayPal pigeonforge2020@gmail.com (for Shadow)